Sunday, March 29, 2015

The tales of a country called Banana Republic: from Dutch Disease to currency crisis

Colombia is a developing country that has faced a political war conflict since 1948. The social cost because of it is high, but during this presidential period Colombia has a real chance to finish this conflict. However, an international economic environment through low crude oil prices can take political and media attention because of it will bring a low economic growth for the next years in Colombia. Therefore, to reach a successful end of this political war conflict, a proper economic environment is needed. This note points the facts that let me think that there is an economic crisis in the current path for Colombia economy, so I give five advices to avoid or mitigate it. The first advice is government and private sector have to keep investing as the last 10 years. The second, the high Current Account deficit in Colombia has to be afforded with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), so central government has to ask for supporting to make Colombia attractive; they have to talk to IMF, World Bank and developed economies who are increasing their money supply such as those in the European Union, China and Japan; these economies can invest in No Mineral sectors in Colombia. The third and fourth advices are a proper tax reform where gasoline prices goes down and public transport tickets also; these decline can pull up aggregate demand through low prices; it means taking advantage of low crude oil price as many economies are doing. The final advice, it is to increase the money supply (M1) to afford indirectly the pension and health system in Colombia, it can be through buying government debt in the local Stock Market.

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal


Colombian economy is under her third Dutch Disease and she is beginning her 14th economic crisis since 1900. However, if central government, foreign governments and international organisation take seriously this tread of economics crisis, Colombia could be a step forward to mitigate it and keeps its long run GDP growth of 4.0%. This note highlights indicators that give information about this crises and puts up economic instruments to overcome it.

Colombia depends of commodities prices and their volumes to afford her foreign expending. Colombia is a country that has global comparative advantage in producing commodities such as crude oil, coal, coffee, flowers, bananas, sugar and cocaine of course. This last commodity shared about 3.0% of total Colombian exports in 2013-14, so it makes cocaine takes the fourth place after crude oil, coal and coffee exports. Crude oil shared about 50.0% of total Colombian exports in 2014, coal shared about 11.0% and coffee shared  about 4.6%. Therefore, if any of these commodities prices dropped in deep through semesters, Colombia could face a currency crisis (Balance of Payments Crises)(1). Unfortunately, this event began on the second semester of 2014, the crude oil price went from about US$100 per barrel to US$50 per barrel. It is clear that Colombian government has been supported her spending under using royalties and taxes from crude oil sales, so she missed about half of their royalties and taxes from this commodity; therefore, it means that Colombian government missed US$7.0 billion for 2015. Houston we are in problems!!!.

Colombia takes incomes from foreign sales to overcome local and international economic crises, but through this crises it is not the case. In the last international crisis, Colombia could growth because of crude oil price was going up and the volume of coal also. Figure 1 shows Colombia GDP cycle and one realises that through international crisis of 2007-9 pulled Colombian cycle up because local government took advantage of minerals markets. Moreover, Foreigners took Colombia as a place to invest in mineral and industrial sectors; FDI net inflows in minerals was about 40% in 2014 in Colombia and FDI net inflows in other sectors was about 60%; therefore, Colombians enjoyed this economic environment for five years. In addition, Colombians increased their household saving to reach 23% of GDP in 2014; the public saving increasing (public deficit went down) also.

Figure 1. Colombian Cycle, and aggregate savings
             Source: Department of Statistics (DANE), Colombian Central Bank and own calculations Stata 13.1.

Colombia could be at the beginning of an economic crisis, and the instruments to sort out it are a well thinking economic policies. The first economic policy advice is government and private sector have to keep spending in physical capital and human capital as they have been doing since 2000; figure 2 shows that Colombian investment went from 15% of GDP in 2000 to 26% in 2014!. The second economic advice is local government, foreign governments such as the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, China, Japan, South Korea and others, and global organisations such as IMF and World Bank promote investment in different sectors of minerals in Colombia. The third economic policy advice is a tax reform where those who have high incomes pay this tax. The only purpose of a tax reform is improve income distribution through better education and better public services; a tax reform in terms of solution for an economic crisis is close to null because it takes saving from households and private firms to increase public saving as the bottom left chart shows. Moreover, tax reform brings negative impact on employment rate in the short run because people move from private sector to public sector (Crowding Out Effect). The fourth economic policy advice is to let gasoline price goes down; central government regulates gasoline price, but as the crude oil price started to go down, gasoline price does not show a significant reduction; Colombian government is taking revenues from this high price through taxes, but they do not realise that this high price is pushing down aggregate demand while in other countries are taking this low price as opportunity to increase monetary supply!. The final economic policy advice is to be flexible with monetary policy, it is time to take advance of low crude oil price that brings consumer prices index down; this monetary flexibility can go to support Colombian pension system and health system; however, under Central Bank rules, there are not a direct instrument to support these public services, so it must be through indirect instruments such as buying central  government debt in the Stock Market as in other periods they did.

Finally, it must be clear that Colombia has to stop of getting external debt because it increases the likelihood of a Foreign Capital Sudden Stop, and it is more expensive due to Peso (Col$) devaluation. Moreover, under actual escenario, my forecast of GDP growth for 2015 is 3.3% while Colombia faced a GDP growth of 4.6% in 2014.

Figure 2. Colombian Investment, FDI net inflows, and its relations
Source: Department of Statistics (DANE), Colombian Central Bank and own calculations Stata 13.1.

 (1). At the end of 2014, Colombia had International Reserves to pay 47% of it external debt (private and public debt) or 80% of her external public debt; therefore, if a Foreign Capital Sudden Stop happened, Colombia would face a currency crisis.

Saturday, August 30, 2014

Political War Conflict Solution: A Sequential Equilibrium

Political War Conflicts have civil victims who must be compensated if society wants to get a long run agreement where arms are taken aside. It is because the Law will work eventually if the society does not compensate these victims. This note deals with this issue and shows that the rational solution of this type of political conflicts is through a compensation for those who were victims of the political war conflict. This compensation is under agreements where parts are “happy” with it. I use Game Theory under Sequential Equilibrium model to achieve this result.

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal.


Game Theory is a tool that lets researchers understand and take decisions when there are interactions between agents; in most of cases, there are rational agents in the environment where the Game Theory is applied. This note deals with an environment where there are two "players" who have an issue and have to take decisions in order to maximise their payoff; it means they are “Rational" and have “Common" knowledge about the environment. These two players are a cartel which has "power" on economic decisions and country Laws decisions, and a low income citizen who just counts with a Constitution printed. The main conclusion is: if the system is not corrupted at all, there is chance for the low income citizen can be favored by the Law with a high cost for cartel whether the cartel does not take the rational option for an agreement; on the other hand, if the system is full corrupted, the citizen will not have any chance to be favoured by the Law.

Environment 
Lets start the “game”. This game is set up under private information scenario. This private information belongs to cartel and is related with level of corruption in the legal system; therefore, there are two types of legal systems: Corrupted System and No Corrupted System. Although the low income citizen does not know the type of the legal system where he is, he can think on probabilities for each type, so he can calculate his payoff. Figure 1 show the game. 

Figure 1. Conflict - compensation game 
(game under private information)

Strategies and payoff
There are strategies for each player and payoffs relate with these strategies; for instance, if cartel is agree with low income citizen about the issue under No Corrupted System, so each one get 20 units of payment. On the other hand, if the cartel is not agree with low income citizen, the payoff can be 5 units for cartel and 50 units for low income citizen. In the case of Corrupted System type, low income citizen will get a negative payment no matter his decision on call the Law or not call the Law.

Path for getting the solution
The solution of this “game" depends on probability that low income citizen assign to each type of system. If the low income citizen takes by sure the type of Corrupted System (it means P=1), his best strategy is No Law Claim or Law Claim but his payments are negative; however, if he gives a tiny chance for No Corrupted System (it mens (1-P) > 0 ), his best strategy is call the Law (Law Claim). Now, the cartel turn; because the cartel knows where it is, its best strategy will depend on it; if the type of system is Corrupted System, it will take No Agreement strategy and its payment will be 20 units; it meas that cartel does not pay attention to low income citizen issue. On the other hand, if the Law system is of type No Corrupted System, it can get a payment of 5 units and the low income citizen will get 50 units of payment whether its choose is No Agreement; therefore, its best strategy is Agreement where its payment is 20 units.

The Sequential Equilibrium 
The solution of this “game" follows the principle of Sequential Equilibrium, it means each player maximise his payments in each state of game. Therefore, there are two Sequential Equilibriums that take my attention:

  1. If P=1, Cartel will choose No Agreement and low income citizen will choose No Law Claim. It means low income citizen does not count with legal instruments because of corruption.
  2. If P<1, Cartel will choose Agreement because low citizen has a credible threat to choose Law Claim. In other words, if cartel randomizes its strategies, its best strategy is to assign probability equal to 1 for Agreement strategy. It means low income citizen counts with legal instruments, so both of them get high payments, 20, 20.
Therefore, because in the real World the Law system is not full corrupted, the Sequential Equilibrium that will prevail is the second one. This type of equilibrium can be taken into account in political conflict such as the Colombian peace process. Victims of war conflict have to get a monetary and social compensation through agreements between illegal groups and government; on the other hand, the process can be unstable because the Law will come eventually, and government and illegal groups will face a hit which can end in protracted conflict armed again.

Sunday, June 29, 2014

Soccer balls market in Colombia goes up as Colombia major team

Colombians main sport is soccer and her soccer balls production has increased in the last years. Colombia is not on the top of producers of soccer balls such as China, Pakistan, Thailand, Germany and Belgium, but it is going up each year through her high quality soccer ball called GOLTY and through small families producers located in Monguí municipality (Boyacá region). The total global production of soccer balls was 60 million in 2013 and Colombia did it with 591 thousand; these Colombian soccer balls were taken by local consumers with 92% and by foreigners consumers from Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Turkey mainly. Moreover, the demand of soccer balls in Colombia has shown an important increase in the last years; per 100 young males in Colombia, there are 6 soccer balls in 2013.

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal


The soccer game is taking the attention around the World because of World Cup and Colombia is not the exception. Therefore, this note deals with soccer balls market in Colombia, so what is the state of this market in Colombia?. To answer this question the local production, international trade and local demand are taken. The main conclusion is Colombia is not on the top of producers of soccer balls as China and Pakistan, but  Colombians demand this type of balls to  be on the top of soccer teams around the World. 

Colombia makes soccer balls for local demand and to export. Colombia increased her production of soccer balls from 303  thousand units in 1995 to 594 thousand in 2013 as figure 1 shows; it means an anual growth average rate of 3.8% between 1995 and 2013. The main producers in Colombia are Escobar y Martínez that began to produce balls in 1950, moreover they make the official soccer balls to Colombian major team called GOLTY; this type of ball GOLTY is the symbol of Colombia soccer and its quality is excellent as many foreigners said. There are other producers such as GERMAN PEÑA that represents soccer balls producers located in the municipality Monguí in Boyacá region. There are other producers located in Cúcuta, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and finally in Bogotá as figure 2 shows. 

Figure 1. Soccer balls market in Colombia 1995-2013
(number of soccer balls)
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades Colombia and Encuesta Anual Manufacturera Colombia.

Figure 2. Soccer balls production places in Colombia 2013
(municipalities)
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades Colombia and Encuesta Anual Manufacturera Colombia.

The soccer balls production around the World is competitive, but Colombia is getting room. The annual production of soccer balls around the World is about 60 million of balls where China, Pakistan, Thailand, Germany and Belgium lead the supply. In terms of international trade, China and Pakistan share with 68% of total units of soccer balls exported as figure 3 shows. The total volume of soccer balls traded were 22 million of soccer balls in 2013. Although Colombia is not on the top places for exporting this type of balls, she exported 13 thousand units in 2013; the main places that demand Colombian soccer balls are Venezuela with 33% of total soccer balls exported in 2013, Ecuador with 29%, Bolivia with 29% and Turkey with 8%. The balance trade of soccer balls in Colombia is negative; it means that Colombians import more soccer balls than those exported; figure 4 shows this trade, and it shows an important increase to reach a net result of 5,158 units in 2013. The main countries that export soccer balls to Colombia are China with 59% of total soccer balls imported in 2013, Viet Nam with 17%, Pakistan with 8% and Thailand with 7%. 

Figure 3. Main countries where soccer balls are made in 2013
(total production 60 million of units)
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades Colombia, Encuesta Anual Manufacturera Colombia, TradeMap and United Nations Data Comtrade.

Figure 4. Trade balance for soccer balls in Colombia
(exports minus imports, units of soccer balls)
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades Colombia, Encuesta Anual Manufacturera Colombia, TradeMap and United Nations Data Comtrade.

The demand of soccer balls has increased in the last years in Colombia. The main sport in Colombia is soccer, nonetheless the Colombia major team was an average team at international  events. However, in the last years Colombia major team has advanced in places on international ranks. This advances are not randomly if one checks the demand of soccer balls in Colombia. Figure 5 shows the per capita demand per 100 of males between 15 and 44 years old in Colombia between 1995 and 2013; as one realises, this demand has increased from 4 soccer balls in 1995 to 6 soccer balls in 2013; therefore, more young Colombians are interested on playing soccer each year. If this interest along government economic support carries on, maybe next generation of Colombia major teams could get more international trophies. 

Figure 5. Per capita demand per 100 of males between 15 and 44 years old in Colombia 1995-2013
(number of soccer balls)
Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades Colombia, Encuesta Anual Manufacturera Colombia, TradeMap and United Nations Data Comtrade.

Sunday, June 1, 2014

International immigration in Colombia between Law and violence

International immigration has played an important role in terms of economic development, so countries have to work hard to reach a free mobility around the World. In Colombia case, Middle East people taught to Colombians how to make good business; Europeans taught industrial techniques and educational models and so; Asians taught agriculture techniques and ways of trade; and people from the region taught football techniques, theatre techniques and many other things. However, the immigration legislation in Colombia at the end of XIX century and beginning of XX blocked people from Middle East and Asia mainly, but this legislation was unsuccessful and people from these countries arrived to Colombia and set their prosperous business. Nonetheless, violence in Colombia can be taken as the main factor to miss foreign people in Colombia, the high periods of violence in Colombia pushed people to leave Colombia along with their business. This note validates these two thesis about immigration in Colombia through official data and an econometric model, so we can add these two facts to those pointed by Safford (1965).

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal

It can be download @ PDF

Colombia has not  been a country where foreigners have found a good environment to live on such as Argentina, Chile, Paraguay or Brasil. There was a huge international emigration from Europe and Asia at the end of XIX century and beginning of XX century because of economic crisis, religious persecution, overpopulation, and antisemitismo; for instance, Europe faced a deep crisis and overpopulation at the end of XIX century, and it pushed people to look for better economic environment and the America was a rational option; the Ottoman Turkish Empire persecuted and pushed down Syrians and Lebanese, so lots of them decided to emigrate to America; moreover, there were Chinese and Japanese that emigrated because of poor economic environment, overpopulation and to take advantages from international trade in Colombia; finally, there was an important immigration because WWI, WWII and post WWII. However, there were few foreigners that decided to take Colombia as final destination. This issue is explained by international literature as consequence of tropical weather, tropical diseases, difficult geography and poor economic development in terms of infrastructure such as main roads and navigability of rivers, see Safford (1965). Local literature adds other issues such as extreme legislation for immigrants (many papers to fill out), poor wastelands for foreigners assigned by government, low public budget to afford an important immigration and strong legislation for those foreigners that came from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe see Behaine (1980), Biermann (2001), Rincón (2002) and Vargas and Suaza (2007). Therefore, this note contributes to this issue in two ways; first, the strong local legislation for those asian, africans and eastern europeans between 1931 and 1937 did not block the immigration to Colombia; therefore, the main factor was the political violence in Colombia; this violence has kicked out foreigners from Colombia since 1851 and in deep since 1946. The methodology to validate it is through an econometric model where a Data Panel Model is run.

Legislation between 1931 and 1937 did not contribute to low immigration in Colombia. Colombia was not absent in the international discussion about the type of human race that a country had to reach at the beginning of XX century, so there were norms that blocked the immigration for those who came from Asia, Africa and some countries of Eastern Europe; for example, the Decree 2247 of 1932 and the Decree 148 of 1935 set quotas for foreigners from Armenia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and other 12 countries; the quota for each country was not above of 20 people per year. Rincón (2002) and Guberek (2009) said that this legislation was unsuccessful because Colombians came from mestizos, there were huge legislation to be known by public servants, many papers to fill out in ports and there was balance discussion in public opinion such as newspaper and politicians still. However, these studies did not show quantitative evidence about international immigration through this period, but fortunately the information was recorded in Colombian census and World Bank Data; Figure 1 shows international immigration in Colombia by region since 1851 according to census and World Bank Data. It is important to highlight that Colombia got hundred of immigrants each year between the end of XIX century and middle of XX century while Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay and the United States got thousands and millions of immigrants each year; moreover, there was an important decline of foreigners in Colombia between 1938 and 1951 and again at the end of XX century.

Figure 1. International immigrants in Colombia 1851-2011
(number of foreigners in Colombia for each year)

Source: Colombian Census and World Bank Data.


This data can be taken into an econometric model, and the result is a no statistical evidence of immigration Law against Middle East and Asia people; moreover, the violence impact on international immigration is significative. The Random Effect Data Panel Model that lets getting this result is:


where:
i : region:  North America, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Asia,

t : period of time: 1851, 1928, 1938, 1951, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2011,

yi,t : it is the volume of immigration according to region: North America, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Asia. It is in logarithmic levels,

x1,i,t : it is the value of trade (exports plus imports) from Colombia at US$ 2012 prices. It is in logarithmic levels,

x2,,i,t : It is a dummy variable that that takes 1 when legislation is active (between 1928-1938) for those immigrants pointed (Middle East and Asia) and 0 otherwise,

x3,i,t : It is a dummy variable that that takes 1 when violence is highly active (years: 1851, 1951, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005) and 0 otherwise,

vi : it is the heterogeneous effect that is random,

Ei,t : it is a random white noise variable. 

The results are those expected, legislation on immigrant quotas was not successful and violence played an important role in reduction of immigrants in Colombia. The econometric model run is shown in table 1; the main result is the impact due to legislation was no statistically significative, and the sign is contrary; it must be negative, but the result was positive (0.699); therefore quotas legislation between 1931 to 1937 did not have effect on immigration in Colombia. On the other hand, violence escenarios in Colombia pulled down the volume of international immigrants in Colombia; this result is statistical significative (-0.433); therefore, violence in Colombia kicked out foreign people from Colombia. The trade variable is a control variable, it takes into account the economic state which is important for immigrants, it is statically significative and its sign is correct. Moreover, a model without legislation effect is significant also and the estimates do not show high variation from statically point of view.


Table 1. Impact on immigration in Colombia due to legislation and violence 1851-2011
(Random Effect Model)
Variable
Model 1: Inmigration
(with legislation effect)
Model 2: Inmigration
(without legislation effect)
International Trade
0.594*
(0.065)
0.577*
(0.064)
Legislation
0.699**
(0.532)

Violence
-0.433*
(0.203)
-0.494*
(0.198)
R2
0.429
0.448
Observations
44
44
Groups
4
4

* Significant at 0.05,
** No significant,
(…) standar deviation. 
Source: Own calculations Stata 13.1.

Bibliography

Behaine, Gladys. 1980. “Anotaciones sobre inmigraciones Libanesas a Colombia”. Revista Javeriana, No. 467, Agosto. Universidad Javeriana, Colombia.

Biermann, Enrique. 2001. Distantes y distintos: los emigrantes alemanes en Colombia 1939-1945. Editorial: Universidad Nacional, Colombia.

Guberek, Simón. 2009 (1974). Yo vi crecer un país. Editorial Siglo del Hombre, Colombia.

Rincón, Natalia. 2002. “Árabes y Judíos en Colombia: Un modelo de integración social”. En revista: Memoria y Sociedad, Vol. 7, No. 13, Noviembre, Bogotá. Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá.

Safford, Frank. 1965. "Foreign and National Enterprise in Nineteenth-Century Colombia”. The Business History Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, Winter, pp 503-526.

Vargas, Pilar and Luz Marina Suza. 2007. Los Árabes en Colombia: del rechazo a la integración.  Segunda Edición. Planeta Ediciones, Colombia.

Sunday, March 2, 2014

Long run prices is when speculation comes to the end: the long run relative price of gold

When economic crisis come (speculation, economic bubbles and so), wealthy people start to demand precious metals and precious stones to store their wealth; therefore, as nominal prices increases, they have precious stones and metals that show higher nominal prices also. However, the real prices measure through relative prices do not change in the long run; it means that precious metals and precious stones will have a constant price in the long run when people will be exhausted with doing speculations. To show this assertion, this note shows that gold relative price in terms of silver converges in the long run; this long run relative price is calculated in 48.7 troy ounces of silver per one troy ounce of gold. It takes attention that ratio between total silver and total gold in the World is lower than long run relative price; it can be explained by the classical view of Use Value and Exchange Value. 

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal

Silver and Gold are precious metals that people take as store of value when economic crisis are coming; these precious metals along diamonds and emeralds are in wealthy people's portfolio; moreover, they expect that these metals and stones show higher nominal price, and this thought is correct; however, in real terms these metals and stones do not show a upward price tendency or downward tendency; they show a convergence price, it means that its value does not change as time passes. This note shows this assertion for gold relative price. 

Gold real price shows a convergence in the long run. The gold real price can be calculated in term of silver units; for instance, a troy once of gold showed a price of 30.5 troy ounces of silver in 1900 and 59.3 in 2013 as figure 1 shows. There were years when this price was higher and lower such as 1941, 1968 and 1991 as figure 1 shows. However, this price shows convergence in the long run; it can be calculated in 48.7 troy ounces of silver per troy once of gold. Therefore, according with this information, one can expect that ratio between total silver and total gold in the World is close to this long run relative price, but it is not; this ratio is just 8.5 times; it means that for each troy ounce of gold there are 8.5 troy ounces of silver. This big difference between gold relative price and the stock ratio can be explained by the Use Value of gold and Exchange Value of gold; it means people prefer gold for its properties and it makes that its relative price is higher than the stock ratio.

Figure 1. Gold relative price in terms of silver 1900-2040 
(Troy ounces of silver per troy once of gold*)
* Lower and Upper band under 0.95.
Source: USGS Mineral Information and KITCO.


The long run gold relative price is statistically significative. To validate the long run relative price, there was run an  econometric  model where relative price is a stationary time series under Augmented Dickey Fuller  test; the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation test show the first lag significative; moreover, the residual shows Normal Distribution properties, and there is no evidence of GARCH effect. The results are shown in table 1; the first  lag shows a  coefficient of  0.93 and it is statistically significative at  0.01 level of significance; this regression takes into account a drift that lets getting a long run expected value of 47.98 (47.0 as it was mentioned above).

Figure 2. Relative gold price Model 
ARIMA (1,0,0)
Variables Coefficients 
Relative price (t-1)
0.93
Long run expected value
46.98
Observations
114
Source: Stata 12.1 and own calculations.

Sunday, February 23, 2014

Silver market in Colombia and World economic activity

The silver market has been small in Colombia since the end of XIX century; other countries in the region produce higher volumes of silver such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Colombia has given 0.14% of total World silver extraction since 1900, so “El Dorado” is just a myth. Moreover, the silver market can be taken as a predictor of economic activity; these two variables are countercyclical, and in Colombia case as GDP faces an increase of 1.0%, the silver market faces a decrease of 0.57%. This result can be extended to World economy; as one realises the international gold and silver prices have shown an important reduction since the end of 2013, so it is expected that investors make their job in real sector. This scenario takes place because of gold and silver are taken as deposit of value for investors when economic crisis take palace.

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal


Colombia as others countries in the region such as Peru, Chile and Bolivia have taken the international attention for their precious metals such as gold and silver. However, the huge volume of these precious metals that were expected through the last half of XIX century and the first decades of XX century was disappointed for Colombia case; foreigners were expected to find huge volumes of these precious metals, but they did not find the place called "El Dorado”. This note can be taken as the second document about precious metals extracted in Colombia during XX and XXI century; the first document was about gold, see my weekly note April 21 of 2013. The point of this note is to show the main statistics of silver extraction in Colombia, and highlight the counter-cycle movement of silver market in Colombia and Colombian economic activity.

Colombia is a small country in silver production. Colombia has produced 1,577 tons of silver since 1885; it means an annual average production of 13.3 tons; this volume of silver can be valued in US$293 millions in 2013; it means 0.1% of Colombian GDP in 2013. The total volume of silver extracted from Colombia since 1900 shares in 0.14% of total World silver extraction since 1900; it means that Colombia is not a main supplier of silver such as the United States, Bolivia, China, Mexico, Russia and Australia. 

Colombia used to extract high volumes of silver at the end of XIX century and beginning of XX century. Antioquia, Bolívar, Chocó and Córdoba are the main regions in Colombia where silver is extracted, but at the the end of XIX century and beginning of XX century were Antioquia, Chocó  (Cauca region in that days) and Tolima. The total volume extracted  between 1885 and 1902 was 50% of total silver extracted until 2013  as one realised in figure 1. Moreover, it takes attention that as international economic crisis started, the volume of silver extraction increased; for intense, after 1929 crisis and 2008 crisis.

Figure 1. Silver production in Colombia 1900-2012
(annual production, Troy once) 
Source: 1900-1910: Ocampo,A. 2013 (1984). Colombia y la economía mundial; 1913-1921: Mineral statistics of British Empire and foreign countries 1913-1922; 1923-1930: Poveda, R. 2005. Historia económica de Colombia en el siglo XX; 1931-2012: UPME, Colombia webpage.

Silver price has shown an important increase in the last years, but this trend is changing. The average silver price since 1900 is US$8.2  per troy ounce in 2013 prices; however, after 2008 crisis the silver price increased to reach US$31.2 per troy ounce in 2012. In 2013, this price decreased to reach US$23.8 per troy ounce as figure 2 shows. This dynamic can be explained by the desire of society, mainly financial markets, to keep their  wealth under dollar depreciation. Moreover, the silver-gold relative price has shown an important decline since 1980; by 1980 the silver relative  price was 0.036 troy ounces of gold, and in 2013 this price was 0.017 troy ounces of gold; this can be explained by huge silver reserves; while gold World reserves were 52 thousand in 2012, the silver reserves were 540 thousand in 2012.

Figure 2. Silver international price
(annual average price, US$ constant prices of 2013 per Troy once) 
Source: USGS and KITCO.

The global economic crisis is ending 

The price of silver and gold showed an important decline in 2013, so this is an  economy signal that global economic crisis is ending. The international silver price was US$31.2 per troy ounce in 2013 and US$23.8 per troy ounce in 2012, and the international gold was US$1,668.9 per troy ounce in 2012 and US$1,411.2 per troy ounce in 2013; moreover, through the first moths of 2014 these prices have shown lower values; for  intense, silver price was US$21.8 in february of 2014 and gold price was US$1,323.6 in february of 2014. If one takes this information and applies an econometric model of supply and demand for Colombia silver market, one realises that economic growth and silver market are countercyclical. It means as the volume of silver demanded shows a decline, the economic activity takes an upward path or the other way around; in Colombia case, an increase of 1.0% of Gross Domestic Product, the silver market shows a decline of 0.57% as table 1 shows (green row). This table shows the positive supply slope and negative demand  slope; moreover, the supply is inelastic while the demand is elastic; the elastic demand can be explained by close substitutes such as gold. One realised that FDI in mining sector in Colombia pushed up the silver production in about 1.0% when this type of investment increases in 1.0%; finally, gold is a substitute of silver; as gold price increased in 1.0%, the silver demand increased in 4.8%. 

Table 1. Supply and Demand for silver in Colombia 1900-2012
(annual data, variables in natural logarithms, econometric model under 3SLS)
Variables Supply Demand
Silver price
0.73%
-4.74%
FDI in mining
1.00%

GDP
-0.87%
-0.57%
Gold price

4.80%
R2
0.65
0.98
Observation
108
108
Source: Own calculations Stata 12.1.

Sunday, February 16, 2014

Economic openness in Colombia?

Colombia has been going with economic openness since her independence. However, there have been moments when Colombia increased her tariffs in order to protect her internal market production. Nowadays, Colombia has signed many Free Trade Agreements; for instance, Canada, the United States, European Union and many other countries. Nonetheless, it appears that Colombia instead of reducing her tariff in the last 4 years, she is increasing them; this statement is validated through local data and World Trade Organisation's data. The problem of protectionism is that it makes the local production lazy and unproductive, moreover local consumers have to pay higher prices for goods that can be cheaper whether economic openness works really. Therefore, it can be a call for local authorities to improve their work on better programs for productive industry and to make a really economic openness where consumers enjoy high quality and cheap goods.

Author: Humberto Bernal,  
Economist,
Twitter: Humberto_Bernal


Colombia is a country that depends on huge volume of imported products as many countries in the World, so she has been working on her economic openness since her independence at the beginning of XIX century. However, in some cases she has taken decisions against this objective; moreover, in the last years she has been signed many Free Trade Agreements; nevertheless, the average tariff instead of going down, it has gone up. This note shows the main periods when Colombia has increased her tariffs in order to protect her internal market, and the contradictory behaviour against Free Trade.

At the end of civil internal war called the Thousand of Days' War in 1902, Colombia decided to increase her tariffs in order to promote internal production; after this war, Colombia was in a deep economic crisis, and one can say that this decision was correct in oder to promote internal production. Years latter, Colombia had an economic crisis because of international commodity prices were down, so the the volume of foreign reserves went down also, and government decided to increase the tariff for imported goods to recover the volume of reserves. This increase is showed in figure 1; therefore, through 20’s and 30’s Colombia faced high tariffs; it can be explained by the economic crisis of 1929 also; this crisis brought scarcity of foreign currency (dollars) and Colombia had gotten a huge debt with the United States and the United Kingdom mainly; therefore, it sounded good to increase tariffs to sort out the Balance of Payments Crisis (B.P.C) on 1931. Same situation was by 50’s; Colombia faced again a B.P.C and increased her tariffs. However, the tariff tendency through these years was downward; it means that Colombia was opened to foreign products in general although there had moments when tariffs were higher. This policy was wrapped up with Colombia new economy model started in 1991; the new economic model was in favour of economic openness.

Figure 1. Average tariff in Colombia 1910-2012
(%*)
* It is calculated as the share of value of taxes for imported goods divided in total value of imported goods in percentage.
Source: Central Bank Colombia; Bureau of Statistics Colombia and own calculations.

However, the tariff in the last years, after signed many Free Trade Agreements, are showing  an upward tendency. Again, figure 1 shows that the tax charged for imported goods as a share of total value of  imported goos went from 5.8% in 2009 to 6.2% in 2012; it means more charges for imported goods. This data goes with World Trade Organisation’s information also; this organisation broadcast that the average tariff  in Colombia increased form 8.4% in 2011 to 8.8% in 2012; of course years before this tariff was higher, but nowadays the tendency is changing.